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Teilhard de Chardin on Insects  
in The Phenomenon of Man
Introduction
The year 2009 saw the publication of a curious work bearing the title The Secret Life of Insects: An Entomological Alphabet (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers). The author, Peter Milward (b. 1925), excels 
in having combined together humour and profundity. The title is indeed curious 
and attention-catching, although it can also be misleading, for in fact the book 
contains a wide series of philosophical and theological reflections. Milward 
himself confesses in the book’s prologue: “I make no claim to entomological 
expertise. That is to say, I confess my ignorance of insects … I know nothing 
about insects, except what everybody knows.”1 As Milward proceeds to explain, 
his original and insightful reflections about insects “go on to discourse about the 
philosophy and the theology of the universe, ending (of course) with God.”2
The year 2009 saw yet another book with an attention-catching title, The 
Love of Two Cockroaches by Edward de Bono (b. 1933), best known for his works 
on lateral thinking and the creation of new perceptions and values. The book 
is a narrative about a male cockroach, Matok, and a female cockroach, Mitsa, 
who dialogue about love. The book, which weds together a stark simplicity to 
a stunning profundity, invites the readers – “mature children” - to delve into 
 * Hector Scerri, Head of the Department of Fundamental and Dogmatic Theology at the 
University of Malta, lectures in Christology, sacramental theology and eschatology. He is the 
President of the Theological Commission of the Maltese Episcopal Conference and consultor to 
the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity.
 1 Peter Milward, The Secret Life of Insects: An Entomological Alphabet (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction, 2009), vii. Peter Milward is a Jesuit priest and literary scholar. He is emeritus 
professor of English literature at Sophia University in Tokyo and a leading figure in scholarship 
on English Renaissance literature.
 2 Ibid., ix.
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the forms and components of love. The preface, alone, marvellously whets one’s 
appetite to read on:
No one seems to like cockroaches. They scurry about their lives doing no harm to 
anyone but are universally disliked and killed on sight.
That is the main reason for writing this book. Its purpose is to show the creatures 
in their own right and in their own world.
To be universally hated is not nice.3
Some months after the publication of the book just described, I was struck 
about the coverage given in the Books and Arts section of The Economist to the 
book Anthill by the Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson (b. 1929),4 a pioneer 
of sociobiology and a two-time Pulitzer prize-winner. The prologue to the novel 
is as insightful as Milward’s declaration above. Wilson states:
This is a story about three parallel worlds, which nevertheless exist in the same 
space and time. They rise together, they fall, they rise again, but in cycles so 
different in magnitude that each is virtually invisible to the others.
The smallest are the ants, who build civilizations in the dirt. Their histories are 
epics that unfold on picnic grounds. Their colonies, like those of humans, are 
in perpetual conflict. War is a genetic imperative of most. The colonies grow 
and struggle and sometimes they triumph over their neighbours. Then they die, 
always.
Human societies are the second world. There are of course vast differences 
between ants and men. But in fundamental ways their cycles are similar. There is 
something genetic about this convergence. Because of it, ants are a metaphor for 
us, and we for them. Homer might have written equally of ants and men. Zeus 
has given us the fate of winding down our lives in painful wars, from youth until we 
perish, each of us.
 3 Edward de Bono, The Love of Two Cockroaches (Malta: Mint Editions, 2009), preface. See 
Peter Serracino Inglott, ‘Thinking about love’, The Sunday Times [Malta], February 14, 2010: 13. 
Edward de Bono is a Maltese physician, author, inventor and consultant. He originated the term 
lateral thinking, wrote the book Six Thinking Hats and is a proponent of the teaching of thinking 
as a subject in schools.
 4 See “It’s a bug’s life,” The Economist, May 1, 2010: 77. Edward Osborne Wilson is an American 
biologist, researcher, theorist, naturalist and author. His biological specialty is myrmecology, the 
study of ants, on which he is considered to be the world’s leading expert.
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Thousands of times greater in space and time is the third of our worlds, the 
biosphere, the totality of all life, plastered like a membrane over all of earth. 
The biosphere has its own epic cycles. Humanity, one of the countless species 
forming the biosphere, can perturb it, but we cannot leave it or destroy it without 
perishing ourselves. The cycles of the other species can be destroyed, and the 
biosphere corrupted. But for each careless step we take, our species will ultimately 
pay an unwelcome price - always.5
An article by Edward G. Farrugia in Melita Theologica,6 coupled with the 
above-mentioned works by Milward, de Bono and Wilson prompted me to 
unearth the manuscript of a previously unpublished set of personal reactions – 
which I penned nearly thirty years ago – to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s account 
on insects in The Phenomenon of Man.7 This article offers a revised version of 
those reflections. The passage of time has led me to a more mature exposition of 
my earlier thoughts on the text.
A Concise Overview of Teilhard de Chardin and his Work
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) presented a doctrine of cosmic 
evolution. A palaeontologist, a scientist and a Jesuit priest, one of the main 
aims of his life was to show that evolutionism does not contradict the beliefs 
of Christianity. He wrote The Phenomenon of Man (Le phénomène humain) 
between June 1938 and June 1940, but he was refused the permission to publish 
this and other works by his ecclesiastical superiors. The work was first published, 
by Editions du Seuil, in 1955, appearing in its English translation four years 
later. Teilhard uses the term phenomenon to refer, as in Greek, to something as it 
appears, not necessarily as it really is. Although Teilhard writes as a scientist, rather 
than as a philosopher or as a theologian, and The Phenomenon of Man contains 
a lot of natural science, its scope and method is, I would say, philosophical. This 
is the reason why I put this work in the same basket as the three contemporary 
works mentioned in the introduction of this article. I can see a golden thread 
which binds together the contents of the four books. The underlying theme of 
The Phenomenon is the surging evolution of life in the world from the primal 
“stuff ” of the universe, through basic forms of life to consciousness and man.
 5 Edward O. Wilson, Anthill: A Novel (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 15-16.
 6 Edward G. Farrugia, “‘L’éternel féminin’ in Teilhard de Chardin: Intoning the Creation 
Octave with Promises to Keep!,” Melita Theologica 63, no. 2 (2013): 19-37.
 7 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959), 170-171.
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The Specialized Nervous System of Insects
In his brief account on insects in The Phenomenon of Man (book 2, chapter 3, 
section 3), within the context of his presentation titled “The Approach of Time,” 
Teilhard de Chardin, from the start, depicts the prominent niche insects occupy 
in the natural world. Teilhard states: “Outside the vegetable kingdom […], there 
are two summits of branches, and only two, which emerge before us in air, light 
and spontaneity: on the anthropod side, the insects; on the vertebrate side, the 
mammals. To which side belongs the future - and truth?”8
Insects, he explains, have a highly specialized nervous system; the nerve 
ganglions concentrate, become localized and grow forward in the head. This is 
called cephalization. This specialization is the result of a differentiation of nerve 
tissue. This indicates an important feature in evolution, namely, that the latter 
is characterized by a direction. In fact, Teilhard affirms quite telegraphically 
that “at the same time instincts become more complex; and simultaneously the 
extraordinary phenomena of socialization appear.”9 This general direction, which 
Teilhard calls complexification, can be seen in the movement “from subatomic 
units to atoms, from atoms to inorganic and later to organic molecules,”10 ending 
up - after a long sequence - with higher forms of life, higher animals and man.
The fact that evolution is a progressive process can be “seen” when investigating 
insect “brains.” I have put brains within inverted commas because this particular 
concentration of nerve fibres in insects cannot be called a brain in our normal 
use of the word, that is, as applied to the brain of higher animals, and, of course, 
human beings. However, to simplify matters, I will refer to the nerve-centre of 
insects as brain.
There is widespread consensus (among scientists and philosophers) that 
the brain is a sign and a measure of consciousness which has developed 
over millions of years. Teilhard calls this aspect of evolution noogenesis.11 In 
 8 Ibid., 169-170. The presentation on insects is only one and a half pages long.
 9 Ibid., 160.
 10 Julian Huxley, “Introduction to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin,” in ibid., 15. Huxley summarizes 
the difficult Teilhardian concept of complexification thus: “This concept includes, as I understand 
it, the genesis of increasingly elaborate organisation during cosmogenesis, as manifested in the 
passage from subatomic units to atoms, from atoms to inorganic and later to organic molecules, 
thence to the first subcellular living units or self-replicating assemblages of molecules, and then 
to cells, to multicellular individuals, to cephalised metazoan with brains, to primitive man, and 
now to civilized societies,” ibid.
 11 The term noogenesis comes from the Greek words νοῦς (mind) and γένεσις (becoming) and 
refers to the emergence of intelligent forms of life. The term was first used by Teilhard de Chardin 
with regard to the evolution of humans. The term nous, for the ancient Greeks, refers to the 
higher part of the soul, whereby intellectual beings can have abstract thoughts and understand. 
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his presentation on the birth of thought (in the first part of book 3 of The 
Phenomenon of Man), the French scientist states: “Psychogenesis has led 
to man. Now it effaces itself, relieved or absorbed by another and a higher 
function - the engendering and subsequent development of the mind, in one 
word noogenesis. When for the first time in a living creature instinct perceived 
itself in its own mirror, the whole world took a pace forward.”12 Cephalization 
can be considered not only from the point of view of the physiological 
development of a “brain,” but also as the yardstick to measure the degree of 
interiorization or the level of consciousness attained by a particular species of 
insect. Noogenesis, of course, refers to self-consciousness which I will refer to 
in the next two sections of this article.
Physical Size versus Mental Power in Insects
Teilhard de Chardin describes insects as our rivals.13 Moreover, he postulates 
this as a possibility. I would limit the eventuality of an insect-dominated 
planet to a mere possibility on account of the size of insects. As long as insects 
retain their current dimensions - they are small and fragile - they have no 
real possibility of ever reaching our degree of domination or “overtaking” 
us. Teilhard states: “The insect cannot grow beyond an inch or two without 
becoming dangerously fragile.”14 However, I ask, what would happen in the 
far-fetched event of the total annihilation of the human species, on account of, 
say, an enormous nuclear catastrophe or widespread disease? In the eventuality 
of the former, one could reasonably imagine the possible occurrence of rapid 
and effective insect genetic mutations. Hence, I tend to agree with Teilhard 
Noogenesis is the fourth of the five stages of evolution described by Teilhard in his first 
posthumously published book, The Phenomenon of Man. Noogenesis, the emergence of the mind, 
follows geogenesis (the beginning of Earth), biogenesis (the beginning of life) and anthropogenesis 
(the beginning of humanity), and is followed by Christogenesis, the genesis of the “total Christ”, 
or the pleroma.
 Noogenesis began with reflective thought, in other words with the first human beings. Teilhard 
affirms that because human beings are self-reflective (i.e. self-conscious) they constitute a new 
sphere of existence on earth: this is the sphere of thought, or the noosphere. The progressive 
consolidation of all human thought into the noosphere is what constitutes noogenesis. This is the 
continual increase in thought and consciousness brought about by the progressive socialization 
of humankind on earth. As human beings continue to socialize, or as Teilhard says, “totalize” 
upon themselves, more complex systems of communication and exchange will continue to result, 
consequently increasing the consciousness of the noosphere. 
 12 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959), 201.
 13 Ibid., 170.
 14 Ibid.
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when he sees insects as our possible successors on the planet. He asks: “Our 
successors, perhaps?”15
This possibility is corroborated by the extraordinary phenomenon of 
socialization in insects. The profound degree of socialization in insects is related 
to their high level of instinct complexity. Insects are seen to “communicate,” 
and there are countless examples when they perform an active and vital sharing 
in common activities, as in the more familiar cases of ants, termites, bees and 
wasps living in complexly-structured “societies.” The “signals” used by insects are 
“recognized” by other members of that species. In other words, insects possess a 
degree of consciousness: they are “aware” of fellow members within the same nest or 
hive, and they are seen to collaborate in extraordinary ways. They are “conscious” 
of their environment, the collaborative presence of fellow members of a nest, 
or the perilous presence of predators and threats to their safety, the presence of 
mates, and shifts in climatic conditions. Are these situations governed simply by 
instinct? Or is there a degree of consciousness? Or is it both? Another question 
may cross the reader’s mind: are insects conscious of being conscious?
Consciousness in Insects
Man is conscious of being conscious. We are aware that we are aware. Insects 
are not conscious of being conscious. They are not self-conscious. The fact that 
they do not communicate through a conventional language (as we humans 
understand this to be) means they cannot express their internal thoughts to 
their fellow insects, at least those belonging to the same species. Reflection upon 
internal thoughts is present only in human beings. Animals, including insects, do 
not possess a linguistic code for expressing inner thoughts (if they are capable at 
this) to other members of their species.
Insects possess a fixed repertoire of signals. They may move or vibrate their 
antennae, eject particular odours, pheromones or secretions, and carry out 
countless other signals which are particular to their species. These have been 
studied by entomologists. However, these signals are uncreative. They are 
stimulus-bound, in the sense that the signals themselves, and other insects’ 
reactions to them, are involuntary responses to specific stimuli, such as the 
presence of prey, food, climatic conditions or mates. Having said so, I highlight 
the fact that insects do communicate, and they do this in a specialized manner, 
thanks to a highly specialized nervous system and thanks to instinct. We cannot 
talk of insects communicating internal, private thoughts. During the twentieth 
century, much philosophical work has been carried out on the relation between 
15 Ibid.
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thought and language, and, according to the majority of philosophers, it is 
incorrect to attribute thinking to something (be it an organism or a machine) 
that does not have linguistic abilities.
This entails the correct and proper use and meaning of the word 
thought and the correct use and meaning of the verb to speak. At this point, 
we have to affirm that an insect’s alleged internal thoughts are simply our 
own projection. Some philosophers accept the presence of what they call 
proto-thoughts or proto-desires in the case of the higher animals. In the case 
of insects, we have to refer to the phenomenon of instinct, as explained 
elsewhere in this article. Teilhard’s point, after all, is that there is a kind of 
continuity between what we see in the life of insects and what we see in the 
human phenomena of the communication of thought and feeling, of socialization, 
and so on.
When a mosquito sees a praying mantis, it is aware that it is seeing something 
dangerous or a source of peril. It is not the compound eye of the mosquito that is 
aware of this fact, for the eye does not see that it sees: a sense cannot reflect upon 
itself. Moreover, in the insect there is no intelligence which can make it aware 
of its sensations and their objects. The higher sense which is performing this 
function is called the central sense. Through the central sense, insects possess sense 
consciousness which is different from self-consciousness. The central sense is not 
conscious of its own activity, that is, there is no such thing as self-consciousness 
in insects, but insects are conscious or, to say it in simpler terms, are aware of the 
activities and the objects of the external senses. Try killing a fly with a swatter! 
The mosquito’s instinctive behaviour, mentioned above, “tells” it to escape from 
the praying mantis. However, this mosquito cannot tell another mosquito that 
it was frightened or that its existence was in danger, because it cannot express its 
internal feelings.
Insect communication is largely based on instinct, and thus it can never 
develop beyond the few biologically important functions it has always been 
linked with, and which are passed from generation to generation of insects. In 
only two out of the twelve references to instinct in The Phenomenon of Man, 
does Teilhard mention the insect world.16 In the first of these references, the 
French palaeontologist contrasts the instinctive behaviour in insects with that 
in mammals. He writes:
In the behaviour of a cat, a dog, a dolphin, there is such suppleness, such 
unexpectedness, such exuberance of life and curiosity! Instinct is no longer 
canalised, as in the spider or the bee, paralysed in a single function. Individually 
 16 Ibid., 173, 176, 185, 190, 194, 197, 200, 201, 310, 315, 331, 332.
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and socially it remains flexible. It takes interest, it flutters, it plays. We are dealing 
with an entirely different form of instinct in fact, and not one subject to the 
limitations imposed upon the tool by the precision it has attained. Unlike the insect, 
the mammal is no longer completely slave of the phylum it belongs to.17
Elsewhere, Teilhard explains that in insects one observes “in the most blatant 
way the existence of hereditarily-formed or even fixed instincts underlying the 
play of animal spontaneities.”18
A Contradiction?
I find it difficult to agree with Teilhard de Chardin when he states that insects 
are “a multitude pathetically involved and struggling in a blind alley;”19 I do not 
agree with him either when he affirms that they are “irremediably stationary.”20 
This does not agree with his own Law of Complexification. Long before living 
things appeared on the Earth, but even today, the “stuff ” of the cosmos was - 
and is - undergoing irreversible changes in the direction of greater complexity of 
organization.
Teilhard’s evolutionary theory, while giving space to Lamarckian21 ideas 
as well as Darwinian22 ones (for example, adaptation to the environment), 
insists rather on increasing complexity and harmonization, resulting in higher 
degrees of consciousness. In my opinion, Teilhard seems to be inconsistent in 
his argument on insects. First, he mentions the possibility of insects being our 
successors as masters of the Earth, then he proposes that insects are at a stalemate 
in their evolutionary history. These two views, if not absolutely contrary to each 
other, are nearly so.
 17 Ibid., 173.
 18 Ibid., 197.
 19 Ibid., 170.
 20 Ibid.
 21 Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), a French naturalist, was an early proponent of 
organic evolution, namely that species could have evolved from previous ones through minor 
changes in their structure. His theory is not widely accepted today.
 22 Charles Darwin (1809-1892), the renowned English natural historian and geologist, 
proposed a different theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin held that since offspring 
tend to be slightly different from their parents, mutations would gradually make an organism 
better adapted to the environment in which it lives. This would lead the better-adapted members 
of a species to develop further, while the weaker ones perish, through a natural process of 
selection. Darwin first illustrated this theory with the help of the Galapagos finches (now called 
Darwin’s finches) who, it is proposed, are descended from a common ancestor, but developed a 
variety of bills to suit various habitats or modes of life. 
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A reason which Teilhard underlines, and which was mentioned above, is the 
small size of insects. In my opinion, this feature does not hinder complexification, 
but may restrict it, and rightly so. The insect’s exoskeleton is a feature which 
has greatly contributed to the ubiquity of insects, and their ability to fit into 
practically every ecological niche on the planet. The exoskeleton is highly 
effective against desiccation and is also waterproof. However, at the same time, it 
“imprisons the organs,”23 and any slight increase in size on the part of the insect 
can only take place during moulting.
“Superior Psychic Levels Demand Physically Big Brains”24
Evolutionary fact and logic demand that brains should have evolved 
gradually as well as bodies. That a potential mind exists in all living systems can 
be obtained by backward extrapolation from the human phase to the biological, 
and from the biological to the inorganic. Besides being a biological fact, it is 
also to be understood philosophically, because as a necessary consequence of 
complexification, there is an intensification of mind and an increase in mental 
potential.
Some biologists claim that the mind is generated solely by the complexification 
of certain types of organization, namely, brains. However, such logic appears 
to be narrow. The brain alone is not responsible for the mind, although it is a 
necessary organ for the manifestation of the latter. Indeed, an isolated brain 
would be a piece of “biological nonsense,” as meaningless as an isolated heart or 
an isolated eye.
It makes more sense to affirm that the mind is generated by or in complex 
organizations of living matter, capable of receiving information of many qualities 
about events, both in the outer world and in the living matter itself, or else of 
synthesizing and processing that information in various organized forms, and of 
utilising it to direct present and future action. Organizations of such complexity 
can arise in the process of evolution when their elaboration enables them to 
incorporate and interiorize varied external information.
Although insects are so sensitive to their environment - the approach of 
predators, fluctuations in temperature or humidity, the presence of edible food 
material or the proximity of possible mates - much of their actions are more the 
result of a highly-developed instinct than a direct result of the “cephalization” 
mentioned above. Cephalization is a characteristic of insects, but the “brain” 
is limited in its size and complexity. The size of the brain in insufficient to 
 23 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959), 170.
 24 Ibid.
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explain the precision of insect movement mentioned by Teilhard de Chardin: 
“In the higher insects a cephalic concentration of nerve ganglions goes hand in 
hand with an extraordinary wealth and precision of behaviour.”25 It suffices to 
mention, for example, the precision of organized life in a bee-hive. I will never 
underestimate the fact that insects are cephalized. This is already a step forward 
and above other lower creatures, particularly when considering the presence of 
sense organs in insects, effector organs, the centralization of nervous fibre, as well 
as a coordinating central nervous system with a “brain.” But the “brain” is still 
small and uncomplex to accommodate “superior psychic levels.”
The “Extraversion” of Consciousness
I have to explain my terminology first. In the mentioned account on insects, 
Teilhard de Chardin affirms that an insect’s “consciousness is extraverted to 
become frozen at once.”26 By extraversion, one means the “rendering manifest.” 
Consciousness (or awareness) is demonstrated by the insect’s actions when 
dealing with the surrounding world. Encountering the environment and 
undergoing new experiences enable the insect to adapt itself to new situations 
which, after repetition, can become incorporated as reflex actions, that is, they are 
“frozen.” But, one may ask, is this not also possible with human beings, although 
the latter are at the top of the ladder of consciousness?
Point (i)27 which Teilhard mentions in the fourth paragraph of the text, 
studied in this article, agrees with the essence of Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
Behaviour which becomes more precise after successive corrections and successive 
generations reminds us of Darwin’s “survival of the fittest.”
Point (ii)28 is more in agreement with Lamarck’s theory of evolution, in 
that adaptation to the environment may involve the loss of certain factors and 
characteristics of and within the insect’s body. It observes, here, that Teilhard is 
consistent with his original argument on complexification in evolution, and is 
also in harmony with other theories of evolution.
 25 Ibid.
 26 Ibid., 171.
 27 “Automatically and continually, one could say, its [i.e. the insect’s] consciousness is 
extraverted to become frozen at once: (i) in its behaviour, which successive corrections promptly 
registered render even more precise…,” ibid., 171. 
 28 “… and (ii) in the long run, in a somatic morphology in which individual particularities 
disappear, absorbed by function,” ibid.
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The Social Life of Insects: The “Paroxysm” of Consciousness
It has already been noted that insects of a particular species possess a 
remarkably high degree of communication among themselves. This is basically 
due to the developed degree of “external” consciousness insects are seen to 
possess. This consciousness is evident in the specialized social life of insects. An 
unbiased visitor from outer space would, in all probability, place the social insects 
around the middle of the scale of social achievement visible on our planet. One 
observes insect sociability in cases of co-operation, division of labour, and group 
cohesion.
Such a high degree of organization is based on the fact that certain members 
of the insect community are specialized to perform specific functions. One 
may conclude that consciousness, in all its paroxysm (acuteness or strong 
expression) finds vent in the mentioned kinds of specialized, often repetitive, 
functions because the brain is not specialized enough to accommodate such a 
potential consciousness (as advocated by Teilhard’s backward extrapolation of 
consciousness) with all its associated faculties. Consequently, it spreads out its 
possible functions into such external actions - hence, the “extraversion” discussed 
above - as social life.
Conclusion
It is indeed remarkable how a brief text, focused on insects, from Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin’s The Phenomenon of Man, could lead us to reflect on a 
number of relevant issues. This article - which takes as its starting-point a number 
of contemporary works where insects feature so prominently - has sought to 
delve into the fascinating world of our six-legged neighbours. Whether they are 
our friendly neighbours (as in the case of butterflies and ladybirds) or our rivals 
or pests (as in the case of cockroaches and mosquitoes) remains debatable. My 
reflections and exegesis of Teilhard’s brief presentation offered a springboard 
to further reflection on themes related to perception, such as the distinction 
between sense consciousness and self-consciousness, and between the brain 
and the concept of the mind. This article also makes a critique of some aspects 
proposed by the French palaeontologist, while at the same time it seeks to build 
a bridge to two of the more well-known theories of evolution. In the foreword 
to his posthumous work, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin expresses his marvel of 
creation and invites the reader to see (in fact, the title of the foreword is Seeing) 
and stand in awe before creation and be faced with a sense of spatial immensity, 
depth, number, proportion, quality (or novelty), movement and, lastly, a sense of
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the organic, discovering physical links and structural unity under the superficial 
juxtaposition of successions and collectivities. … I repeat that my only aim, and my 
only vantage-ground in these pages, is to try to see; that is to say, to try to develop 
a homogeneous and coherent perspective of our general extended experience of 
man. A whole which unfolds.29
Insects are part of this unfolding whole.
 29 Ibid., 39.
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